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During the next few minutes I will address certain issues related
to intervention raised by the Panama Canal treaties. I am having
some treaty texts and other references distributed that are ger-
mane to what I plan to say. While these papers are being passed
out, I will take the opportunity to say that it is a real pleasure for
me to be here to participate in a symposium honoring Dean Rusk.
We at Vanderbilt Law School had the pleasure of having him make
what I believe was his first public statement on American foreign
policy after he left public office. Professor Rusk had for a period
refrained from commenting upon issues in the international scene
and our International Law Society was very grateful for his visit. I
do remember specifically that the New York Times had just pub-
lished an article that referred to Dean Rusk's "exile to the State of
Georgia." He informed the audience that if he had ever been in
exile it had been earlier and not later because as a native Georgian
he was in fact an expatriate come home. Having seen this beautiful
campus I understand exactly what he meant.
The dilemmas associated with intervention are illustrated by the
problems faced by the United States and Panama in negotiating
the Panama Canal treaties. The background of the Panamal Canal
negotiations is relatively well known. To review briefly, agitation in
Panama about the presence of the United States in the Canal Zone
occurred after World War II. It continued until the treaties were
finally signed by the United States and Panama on September 7,
1977. Distinguishing the two treaties is important. The first treaty,
the Canal Treaty,1 provided that the United States would adminis-
ter the Canal for Panama until the year 2000, at which time full
administration of the facility would pass to the Panamanians. The
second treaty, the Neutrality Treaty,' declared that the Canal was
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to remain permanently neutral in both peace and war. Only the
Canal is declared neutral. The country of Panama itself is not obli-
gated to maintain neutrality. Leaving aside the question of how
one makes a waterway neutral without making its littoral state
neutral, I would like to discuss the right of the United States to
participate in the defense of the Canal after December 31, 1999,
both against third countries and against threats that might arise in
Panama itself.
The treaties were politically highly sensitive in both countries.
In the United States there was a great deal of resentment over
what was seen by some as a giveaway of United States territory.
Ultimately, whether the United States Senate would give its advice
and consent to the treaties turned on two issues. The relevant is-
sue for our purposes was the question whether the United States
would have the right under the treaties after December 31, 1999 to
defend the Canal against attack, either by hostile external forces or
by Panamanian groups that might become hostile to United States
interests.
The legal issues related to intervention arise in part from the
treaty provisions. In the Canal Treaty, full rights of territorial sov-
ereignty over the Canal and the Zone are recognized as residing in
Panama. In turn, the Panamanians granted to the United States
the right to maintain troops within Panamanian territory to de-
fend the Canal until the year 2000. Article 1, paragraph 2, of the
Canal Treaty is clear on this point. Article 1 states: "The Republic
of Panama as territorial sovereign grants to the United States of
America for the duration of this treaty the rights necessary to pro-
tect and defend the Canal. '"8 The right to defend the Canal results
exclusively from this express grant by Panama. Neither party
claimed that the right derived from any customary practice that
might have arisen by virtue of long term United States presence in
the Canal Zone.
Once the Canal Treaty lapses on December 31, 1999, rights and
obligations between the two countries related to the Canal will be
defined solely by the Neutrality Treaty which continues in
perpetuity. The Neutrality Treaty, however, recognizes no right in
the United States either to maintain troops in Panama or to enter
that country to defend the Canal against either external or internal
threat. Article 4 of the Treaty states only that the two countries
inafter cited as Neutrality Treaty].
3 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 2.
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would "maintain the regime of neutrality" established in the
Treaty. Article 5 explicitly limits the right to defend the Canal by
providing that "[a]fter the termination of the Panama Canal
treaty, only the Republic of Panama shall operate the canal and
maintain military forces, defense sites and military installations
within its national territory."4
The Canal Treaty and the Neutrality Treaty were negotiated as
part of the same transaction and they must therefore be read in
pari materia. Consequently, since defense rights were given to the
United States only for the duration of the Canal Treaty, and since
that explicit grant was before the negotiators when they negotiated
the Neutrality Treaty, it is clear that under the then existing texts
of the two treaties the United States had no right to intervene in
Panama to defend the Canal against either external or internal
threat after the year 1999 without additional Panamanian permis-
sion to do so.
The United States and the Republic of Panama were faced with
a serious political and legal dilemma growing out of issues related
to intervention. The treaties were viewed as vitally important by
the governments of both countries; but a right to intervene to pro-
tect the Canal was important to United States Senate ap-
proval-and an anathema to the Panamanian public. In an at-
tempt to resolve the dilemma, President Carter and General Omar
Torrijos, President of Panama, met and issued a joint communi-
qu6-a "statement of understanding" of the meaning of the Neu-
trality Treaty. The communiqu6 stated that the correct interpreta-
tion of United States-Panamanian responsibility to maintain the
regime of neutrality in the Canal after 1999 was
that each of the two countries shall in accordance with their re-
spective constitutional processes defend the Canal against any
threat to the regime of neutrality and consequently shall have the
right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the
Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the
Canal.'
This statement appears to be directly contrary to the then ex-
isting terms of the Neutrality Treaty, giving Panama the exclusive
right to maintain a defense capability. Consequently, it could have
effect only as a modification of the treaty text. The United States
Neutrality Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5.
' Joint Carter-Torrijos Communique, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1547 (Oct. 14, 1977).
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Senate resolution approving the treaty added this language as a
formal amendment, suggesting that the existing treaty language
did not include common defense rights. When the communiqu6
was issued, it was explicitly characterized as being solely an inter-
pretation of the existing text. Therefore, the clause created, at
best, a way out of the United States domestic political dilemma,
but not an escape from the legal one. On the other hand, this solu-
tion to the United States political problem would create serious
domestic political and legal difficulties in Panama. An attempt to
address this problem was made in the communiqu6's next para-
graph. That paragraph provided that:
This does not mean, [referring to the first paragraph] nor shall it
be interpreted as a right of intervention of the United States in
the internal affairs of Panama. Any United States action will be
directed at ensuring that the Canal will remain open, secure and
accessible and it shall never be directed against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of Panama.'
This paragraph, by including the phrase "against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence," clearly incorporates by refer-
ence the corresponding provision in article 2, paragraph 4, of the
United Nations Charter. One interpretation of that Charter lan-
guage makes the territory of any state absolutely inviolate. Under
this strict interpretation of the phrase, the second paragraph of the
Carter-Torrijos communiqu6 explicitly denied the right of the
United States to enter Panamanian territory to defend the Canal.
This same paragraph was also added by the United States Senate
as an amendment to the treaty. Thus, under this interpretation,
any United States rights to defend the Canal that might be in-
ferred from the first paragraph of the statement would necessarily
be limited to action on the high seas.
A different and more limited interpretation of the Charter
phrase would proscribe only activities designed to change the geo-
graphical boundaries of a state or to subject it to foreign rule or
undue influence. Under this interpretation, the United States
might in fact have the right to enter Panamanian territory to de-
fend the Canal under the provisions of the first paragraph, but it
could do so only as long as its use of force was directed against
third parties and not, for example, against Panamanian insurrec-
tionists. However, I believe this more liberal interpretation of the
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language of the second paragraph is clearly foreclosed by the ex-
plicit provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American
States (OAS), especially when those provisions are viewed in their
historic context.
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the United States
was viewed by many as the chief practitioner of intervention in
Latin American affairs. This practice was hardly unknown, one
might add, between the smaller states in the hemisphere as well.
Leaving that aside, however, the threat of intervention came to be
viewed, correctly or not, as a hallmark of United States diplomacy
by some Latin American countries. The Calvo Doctrine, that both
armed and diplomatic interventions to enforce private claims are
illegal, and the Drago Doctrine, that armed intervention to enforce
a public debt is illegal, were predecessors of eventual conventional
agreements that outlawed intervention. In 1948, these efforts re-
sulted in article 18 of the OAS Charter that explicitly forbids in-
tervention of any kind in the "internal and external affairs of any
other state."'7 Article 20 of the OAS Charter provides: "The terri-
tory of a state is inviolable. It may not be the object even tempora-
rily of military occupation or other measures of force taken by an-
other state directly or indirectly on any grounds whatever."' This
prohibition could hardly be more absolute. Therefore, unless the
Neutrality Treaty, as modified by the language in the Carter-Tor-
rijos communique, waives Panamanian rights under article 20 of
the OAS Charter, the United States received no right under the
Treaty to enter Panama to defend the Canal. Such an interpreta-
tion could never have been intended by Panama, given the genesis
and history of the negotiations and the political climate in Panama
itself. Although Ambassador Boyd, the Panamanian Ambassador
to the United States, did at one point tell a United States televi-
sion audience that the Treaty did confer on the United States a
right of entry to defend the Canal, that statement clearly did not
reflect the intent of the Panamanian government about its obliga-
tions under the Treaty.
The only interpretation of the joint communiqu6 language si-
multaneously giving effect to the communiqu6's first paragraph
(addressing the United States defense role under the Neutrality
Treaty) and preserving the territorial inviolability standards of the
OAS Charter is one that: (a) confirms the right of the United
7 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER art. 18.
B Id. art. 20.
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States to act against third countries in defense of the Canal, but
that (b) does not include in this right the legal authority to enter
Panamanian territory or to resist threats arising inside Panama.
Such an interpretation would make the communiqu6 consonant
with article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, at least
vis-A-vis Panama, and additionally would give effect to article 103
of that Charter, which provides: "In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of members of the United Nations under the pre-
sent charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present charter will pre-
vail."9 Therefore, the only logical interpretation of the communi-
qu6 language that will give simultaneous effect to all pertinent in-
ternational agreements and to existing customary law is one that
limits United States defense rights to those that can be exercised
without intervention in Panamanian Territory.
I now refer briefly to two other elements of the Treaty-the two
reservations that were attached by the United States Senate. In
effect, adoption of the reservations was the price of the Senate's
advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaties by the Presi-
dent. These reservations were of much more serious concern to the
Panamanians than was the addition to the Treaties of the language
from the Carter-Torrijos communiqu6 by amendment.
Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini submitted the following lan-
guage, which was adopted in the Senate by a vote of 75 to 23 on
March 15, 1978, as a reservation to the Neutrality Treaty. It pro-
vides that:
If the Canal is closed or its operations are interfered with the
United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each
independently have the right to take such steps as it deems nec-
essary in accordance with its constitutional processes including
the use of military force in Panama to reopen the Canal or to
restore the operations of the Canal, as the case may be.1"
The plain meaning of this reservation is that the United States
may intervene militarily in Panama in order to keep the Canal
open after the year 1999, without the need of any additional Pana-
manian consent. The Senate's adoption of this reservation out-
raged the Panamanian public. The government of Panama circu-
lated a letter in the United Nations claiming that the United
U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
'0 Neutrality Treaty, supra note 2.
222 [Vol. 13:217
PANAMA CANAL
States had taken, by reservation, a right to intervene militarily in
Panama in violation of the principles of the United Nations Char-
ter. To deal with this situation, Senator DeConcini agreed to the
following reservation to the Canal Treaty which was approved on
April 18, 1978:
Pursuant to its adherence to the principle of non-intervention,
any action taken by the United States of America in the exercise
of its rights to assure that the Panama Canal shall remain open,
neutral, secure and accessible, shall be only for the purpose of
assuring that the Canal shall remain open, neutral, secure and ac-
cessible, and shall not have as its purpose or be interpreted as a
right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of
Panama or interference with its political independence or sover-
eign territory.1
Like the relationship between paragraphs one and two of the
joint communiqu6 now ensconced as amendments to the treaty,
these DeConcini reservations, taken together, give and take away
with the same hand. They arguably leave the United States in the
position, after 1999, of being able legally to enter Panama to pro-
tect the Canal against third countries, a right that apparently in
the Senate's view did not exist under either the original Treaties or
under the communiqu6 language. Even this right is doubtful, how-
ever, since the language of paragraph two of the communique ex-
plicitly prevents interference with Panama's territorial integrity
and is now an amendment to the Treaty text, while in both in-
stances, the DeConcini language is solely a unilateral reservation.
In conclusion, there is no right for the United States to enter
Panama to protect the Canal under the existing Treaty provisions,
amendments and reservations. There also is no such right in cus-
tomary international law. It has been argued that perhaps a right
to defend the Canal might be exercised on behalf of the interna-
tional community without the requirement of Panamanian con-
sent. That proposition raises exactly the same argument voiced by
the British and the French in the Suez crisis which was rejected by
the United States at that time. Another argument (specious, in my
opinion) is that the acquiescence of Panama in the United States
use of force to defend the Canal during World War II recognized
that defense of the vital waterway amounted to the exercise of a
right of self defense by the United States. The intervening promul-
I I d.
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gation of article 51 of the United Nations Charter seriously affects
that argument, even if intent in time of a world war could be trans-
ferred over sixty years to circumstances of lesser international
exigency.
There is one last argument that I have heard. It is a non-legal
argument and it may, I think, summarize most effectively the
problem and the dilemma that we face. I was participating in an
informal discussion of these issues with a group of lawyers from
the State and Defense Departments while the Treaty texts were
still in preparation. As I recall, one of those present was a member
of the United States military who, I think, was not a lawyer. He sat
and listened to the discussion for about twenty minutes without
saying anything. Then he finally articulated what may be the bot-
tom line. He said, "You know I found this a very interesting argu-
ment, but if the Canal is threatened, either from inside or outside
Panama, I'm sure we will defend it, and it's obvious that we have
sufficiently excellent lawyers here to find several legal bases from
which any armed activity to defend the Canal could be justi-
fied-and if you can't find one, by the time you have finished de-
bating it, we'll have won the war anyway."
Well, he clearly spoke facetiously. But he may in fact have
pointed out the real dilemma-the dilemma that arises in all inter-
vention situations. Intervention does not occur except when it is
perceived to be in the important interests of the intervening coun-
try. At the same time, there is a vital systemic interest for all na-
tions to prevent such acts in response to short-term national self
interest in order to serve the greater long-term interest of all mem-
bers of the community of states in maintaining a stable world or-
der. To contribute to a system that will recognize both of these
realities is an important role for the law of intervention. As is ap-
propriate for any law professor, I merely raise these questions
without providing any of the answers.
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